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Abstract
In this article, I will examine the means by which European Community institutions have
used consumer protection, and their impact. I will also examine the new proposals concerning
consumer protection, and their impact. Finally, I will look at what the likely outcome of these
proposals may be, if implemented.

LL.M PERSPECTIVES
THE IMPACT OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
ON BANKING LEGISLATION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND THE EFFECT OF THE RECENT
CONSUMER PROTECTION PROPOSALS
Thomas F Tayloi*
The law concerning consumer protection and banking has
changed dramatically in Europe over the last forty-six years.
These two areas have often interacted with each other, either
through the action of legislative bodies or decisions of the Court
of Justice. In particular, both European Community consumer
protection policy and legislation have had a significant impact
on banking legislation. In this Article, I will examine the means
by which Community institutions have used consumer protection policy to affect banking legislation and the results obtained.
I will also examine the new proposals concerning consumer protection, and their impact. Finally, I will look at what the likely
outcome of these proposals may be, if implemented.
This Article will deal with the "consumer" in terms of an
individual person. When I speak in terms of consumer policy or
consumer protection, I will be referring to policy and protection
in regard to a consumer's economic interests. A bank in this
Article will refer to a "credit institution" as defined in Article 1 of
the 1977 Council Directive No. 77/780 ("First Banking Directive"): "[A] n undertaking whose business is to receive deposits
or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for
its own account ....."
* Candidate for LL.M. in Banking, Corporate and Finance Law, May, 2005; J.D.,
Vanderbilt University School of Law, 1976; B.A. Lambuth University, 1970. The Author
would like to thank Professor Roger Goebel for his insight, suggestions, and encouragement in the preparation of this Article. The Author would also like to thank the editors
and staff of the Fordham InternationalLawJournal in particular Wynne P. Kelly, for their
help and assistance.
1. Council Directive No. 77/780, art. 1, O.J. L 322/30 (1977) (First Council Directive 77/780/EEC of 12 December 1977 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and
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I. THE TREATY OF ROME
A. Initial Goals of the European Economic Community
In 1958, at the time of the establishment of the European
Economic Community, the Treaty of Rome 2 set out several goals
in its preamble. Two are important for this Article. The Parties
to the Treaty stated that they were "DETERMINED to lay the
foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe . . . ." That is, the Parties wished to create a common or
internal market free of internal barriers. In that regard, the
Treaty specifically set as two of its goals the elimination of any
restrictions on the free movement of services across Member
State lines4 and the abolition of any restrictions on establishment
in one Member State of businesses headquartered in another
Member State.'
Second, the contracting parties stated that they were "AFFIRMING as the essential objective of their efforts the constant
improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples."6 However, no articles dealt directly with a general consumer protection policy. There were a few articles that contained within them the kernel of a more developed consumer
protection position. Article 2 stated that the Community shall
promote, among other things, "an accelerated raising of the
standard of living . . . ."I Article 39 of the Treaty stated that the
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit
institutions) [hereinafter First Banking Directive].
2. See Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The European Union ("EU") is currently
governed by an amended version of the Treaty of Rome. See Treaty on European
Union, O.J. C 325/1 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 67 [hereinafter Consolidated TEU], incorporating
changes made by the Treaty of Nice amending the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities and certain related acts, Mar. 10, 2001, O.J. C 80/1 (2001) [hereinafter
Treaty of Nice], and the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, OJ. C 340/1 (1997)
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (amending Treaty on European Union ("TEU"),
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Treaty establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community "Euratom Treaty"), and renumbering articles of TEU and Treaty
establishing the European Community) [hereinafter E.C. Treaty].
3. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, Recital
1.
4. See id. arts. 59-66.
5. See id. arts. 52-58.
6. Id. Recital
3.
7. Id. art. 2.
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objectives of the common agricultural policy include the guaranteed availability of supplies and the stabilization of markets, and
also mentioned the aim "to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices."' Article 85(3) of the E.C. Treaty made
authorization for certain agreements between undertakings subject to the consumer receiving "a fair share" of the resulting benefit,9 while Article 86 gave, as an example of unfair practices,
"limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers."10
B. The Process to Achieve the Goals
The Treaty of Rome originally created four major institutions to carry out its goals - the Parliament, the Council, the
Commission, and the Court of Justice. 1" The Parliament, Coun-2
1
cil, and Commission are involved in the legislative process.
Traditionally, the Commission has had the sole right to initiate
legislation in the domain of Community affairs, particularly the
Internal Market. 13 Once agreement on the proposed text has
been reached within the Commission, it is then published as a
proposal. At any moment throughout the procedure, the Commission may withdraw or amend its proposal.14
After a short interim period, the Commission seeks the endorsement of the proposal by the European Parliament. The
E.C. Treaty lays down four procedures by which Parliament is
involved. One of these is used with each particular proposal, depending on the nature of the proposal:
1. Consultation, by which only an opinion from the Parliament is permitted;
8. Id. art. 39.
9. Id. art. 85(3).
10. Id. art. 86.
11. Id. art. 4.
12. See GEORGE A.

BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW

82-100 (2d ed. 2002); see also The EU Committee of the American Chamber of Com-

merce in Belgium, Business Guide to EU Initiatives 2004, Instruments and Implementation,
available at http://web.lexis.com/lawschoolreg/researchlogin04.asp
ness Guide].

[hereinafter Busi-

13. Business Guide, supra note 12, § 4. Under transitional arrangements with which
we are not concerned in this Article, Member States share this responsibility on matters
related to the free movement of persons. See id.
14. See id.
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Assent, by which Parliament must approve or oppose a
proposal but cannot make amendments;
Cooperation, by which two readings by the Parliament
are given; before the second, the Council adopts a common position (used only for economic and monetary affairs); and
Co-decision, by which the Parliament may amend or veto
(by an absolute majority) a Council common position. In
this event, the Council may call a Conciliation Committee
(50% Council members and 50% Parliament members 24 members in total) to explain its position. If the point
of contention remains unresolved after talks
in the Com15
mittee, Parliament can veto the proposal.

The Council must also approve proposals. Legislation can
take several forms. They are as follows:
1.

2.

3.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Regulations - Have general application and are specifically addressed to the Member States. They are binding
in their entirety and are directly applicable in all Member
States. 16
Directives - Define the results to be achieved in a particular area while leaving it to national authorities to decide7
the form and means for achieving the desired aim.'
One specific strategy involving directives that the parties
to the Treaty planned to use to achieve the goals set out
in the Treaty was the process of "approximation. "18 By
approximation (often called harmonization1 9 ), the
Treaty is referring to the adoption of directives pertaining to a field of law applicable throughout the internal
market. The Member States must adopt relatively uniform laws which implement the directives. The Member
State laws usually do not have to be identical. 20 However,
a directive might require "full" harmonization. That is,
the directive might be very detailed and require specific
21
laws of the Member States, with few, if any, exceptions.
Decisions - Have a specific range of application and can
be directed at individual Member States, companies, or
See id.
See E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 249, O.J. C 325/1 (2002).
See id.
See Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 100.
See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 12, at 538.
See id.
See id. at 556.
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private individuals. Decisions
are binding upon those to
22
whom they are addressed.
Recommendations and opinions - Issued by the Commission, Council, Parliament, Economic and Social Committee, and Committee of the Regions. They give nonbinding Community views on a number of topics, normally to encourage desirable, but perhaps un-enforceable, good practices throughout the European Union
("EU"). These may be
addressed to Member States and
23
economic operators.

There are also additional publications that, while not binding, carry weight within the Community. They are as follows:
Resolutions - Issued by the Council and/or the Parliament. Resolutions are intended to establish the fundamental principles on which Community action will be
based and to determine the period within which the action will be taken. Resolutions are only declarations of
intention which express mainly the "political wish" of the
Council.2 4
2. Green & White Papers - Prepared and issued solely by
the Commission. Green Papers focus on a particular area
of interest for which the Community has not yet produced legislation. A Green Paper is designed to be a consultative document, addressed to interested parties, all of
which are then invited to give their input to any possible
future legislation. Similar to Green Papers, White Papers
are used as vehicles for the development of policy in areas that have not yet come under existing
legislation.
25
White Papers focus on broader areas.
3. Communications - Prepared by the Commission. Communications are usually produced as a result of comments received after the release of a Green Paper. The
Commission has also issued Communications on the interpretation of Court cases and on several other subjects. 26
4. Studies - Studies are usually prepared by a third party at
the request of the Commission. They are designed to be
an overview of a particular area of activity within the
1.

See
See
See
See
See

E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 249, O.J. C 325/1 (2002).
id.
Business Guide, supra note 12, § 4.
id.
id.
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27

The Court of Justice has the authority to review legislative
acts of the institutions of the European Community. 28 Although
the judgments of the Court are "essentially declaratory," Article
233 of the E.C. Treaty provides that when an act is declared void,
the institution must "take the necessary measures to comply with
the judgment. "29 Legislative acts may be challenged by the
Council, the Commission, Member States, Parliament, the European Central Bank, and the Court of Auditors. ° Private parties
may also institute proceedings against decisions of an institution
"addressed to that person or against a decision which . . . is of
3
direct and individual concern to the former." '
II. EVOLUTION THROUGH THE 1980s
The first European Community legislative action directly
concerning banking and consumer policy began in the early
1970s. At the Paris Summit conference in Paris in October 1972,
the Heads of State or Government emphasized the need for the
"strengthening and coordination of action for consumer protection within the European Economic Community ....

,,2 The

result was the Preliminary Programme of the European Economic Community for a Consumer Protection and Information
Policy ("1975 Programme"), adopted in 1975.
In 1981, the
Council adopted the Second Programme of the European Economic Community for a Consumer Protection and Information
Policy. 4 These two Programs set out the position of the Community on consumer protection for the first time since the sign27. See id.
28. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 230-31, O.J. C 325/1 (2002).
29. E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 233, O.J. C 325/1 (2002). See BERMANN ET
supra note 12, at 130.

30. See

BERMANN ET AL.,

AL.,

supra note 12, at 129-32.

31. E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 230,
4, O.J. C 325/1 (2002).
32. Council Resolution of 14 April 1975, O.J. C 92/1 (1975) (on a Preliminary
Program of the European Economic Community for a consumer protection and information policy). See Preliminary Programme of the European Economic Community for
a Consumer Protection and Information Policy, O.J. C 92/2 (1975) [hereinafter 1975
Programme].
33. See id.
34. See Council Resolution of 19 May 1981, O.J. C 133/1 (1981) (on a Second
Programme of the European Economic Community for a Consumer Protection and
Information Policy).
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ing of the Treaty.3 5 The 1975 Programme called for, among
other things, "effective protection against damage to consumers'
economic interests . . . ."' Specifically, the Council called for
action to harmonize the general conditions of consumer credit
and asked the Commission to submit proposals. 7 It also called
for action to protect the consumer against false or misleading
advertising3 8 and to protect consumers from unfair commercial
practices in areas such as contract terms.3 9
In regard to banking, in 1973 the Council adopted Directive
73/183/EEC ("1973 Directive"), on the freedom of banks to

provide services and establish themselves in States outside of the
Member States where they were headquartered.40 In 1977, the
Council passed the First Banking Directive.4" The 1973 Directive
applied the national treatment principle, which required the
equal regulatory and supervisory treatment of all institutions operating in one country regardless of their nationality.4 2 The First
Banking Directive also applied the national treatment principle,43 but also started the process of harmonizing Member State
laws. For example, in Article 3 of the Directive the Council required Member States to require banks to obtain authorization
before commencing their activities. They were to establish the
requirements for such authorization, subject to specific standards.44
The steps in these Directives were very limited. For example, in the First Directive, Member States could still "make the
commencement of business in their territory by branches of
credit institutions covered by [the First Banking] Directive which
have their head office in another Member State subject to authorization according to the law and procedure applicable to
35. Id.

1, o.J. C 133/1, (1981).

36. 1975 Programme, supra note 32,
14 B, O.J. C 92/2 (1975).
37. See id. 4 20-21, O.J. C 92/2 (1975).
38. See id. § II,
22 (ii), O.J. C 92/2 (1975).
39. See id. § 11, 4 24 (iii), O.J. C 92/2 (1975).
40. See Directive 73/183/EEC, O.J. L 194/1 (1973) (on The Abolition of Restrictions on Freedom of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services for Self-Employed
Activities of Banks and other Financial Institutions Directive) [hereinafter 1973 Directive]; see also Jean Dermine, European Banking: Past, Present and Future (Dec. 2002), at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=357500.
41. See First Banking Directive, supra note 1, O.J. L 322/30 (1977).
42. See 1973 Directive, supra note 40, art. 3 (1), OJ. L 194/1 (1973).
43. See First Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 4, O.J. L 322/30 (1977).
44. See id. art. 3, 44 2-4, O.J. L 322/30 (1977).
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credit institutions established on their territory."4 5 Further, a
Member State could withdraw authorization for one of several
reasons, including a situation where the host State's national law
provides for withdrawal of authorization.4 6
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Council announced
in the First Banking Directive that the results of the process in
which they were engaged "should be to provide for overall supervision of a credit institution operating in several Member States
by the competent authorities in the Member State where it has
its head office. ... "7 Thus, the Council strategy at the time was
to temporarily allow a host State to continue to supervise banks
that entered it from another Member State, but its long-term
goal was the transfer of that power to the State where the bank
had its head office.
In the meantime, case law was developing that would have a
direct impact on the internal market and banks. In 1974, in the
Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnjverheid case involving the freedom of movement of services,4 8
Dutch authorities had refused to allow a Dutch national residing
in Belgium to represent a party in a Dutch administrative proceeding pursuant to a Dutch law requiring legal representatives
to be residents of the Netherlands. 49 The Court overturned the
Dutch law on the basis of Article 59 (now Article 49) but added
that in certain circumstances "specific requirements imposed on
the person providing the service cannot be considered incompatible with the Treaty where they have as their purpose the application of professional rules justified by the general good
.... -50 In the 1977 Rewe-Zentral vs. BundesmonopolverwaltungFur
Branntwein ("Cassis de Dijon") case, 51 the Court ruled that the administrative decision in question, which prohibited the import of
a French liqueur into Germany because it did not meet certain
German legal specifications, violated Article 30 (ex Article 36) of
the E.C. Treaty. 52 The Court recognized that obstacles to the
45. Id. art. 4, O.J. L 322/30 (1977).
46. See id. art. 8(e), O.J. L 322/30 (1977).
47. Id. Recital
3, O.J. L 322/30 (1977).
48. Case C-33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1299.
49. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 12, at 662.
50. Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. 1299,
12.
51. Case C-120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649 [hereinafter Cassis de Dijon].
52. Article 30 deals with quantitative restrictions on imports. See E.C. Treaty, supra
note 2, art. 30, O.J. C 325/1 (2002).
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free movement of goods must be accepted "in so far as those
provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of... the defence of the consumer" 3 but rejected Germany's assertion that the decision was, among other things for
"the protection of the consumer against unfair commercial practices."" In 1984, in the Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v.
Klopp case, the Court seemed to extend its reasoning in the
above two cases to the freedom of establishment.5 5
The Commission took its cue from the Cassis de Dijon case
and concluded in a communication concerning the case to the
Council:
Any product imported from another Member State must in
principle be admitted to the territory of the importing Member State if it has been lawfully produced, that is, conforms to
rules and processes of manufacture that are customarily and
traditionally accepted in the exporting country, and is marketed in the territory of the latter...
Only under very strict conditions does the Court accept exceptions to

this principle, barriers to trade resulting from differences between commercial and technical rules are only admissible:
- If the rules are necessary, that is appropriate and not excessive, in order to satisfy mandatory requirements (public
health, protection of consumers or the environment, the
fairness of commercial transactions, etc.);
- If the rules serve a purpose in the general interest which is
compelling enough tojustify an exception to a fundamental rule of the Treaty such as the free movement of goods;
- If the rules are essential for such a purpose to be attained,
i.e. are the means which are the most
appropriate and at
56
the same time least hinder trade.
Although not mentioning the Cassis de Dijon case by name, the
Commission in its White Paper on Completing the Internal Market did indirectly refer to that case when discussing the free
movement of goods. It stated that:
53. Cassis de Djon, [1979] E.C.R. 649, 1 8.
54. Id.
9.
55. Case C-107/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2971.
56. Communication from the Commission Concerning the Consequences of the
Judgment Given by the Court ofJustice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 ('Cassis de
Dijon'), O.J. C 256/2, at 2 (1980) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1980 Communication
from the Commission].
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[G]oods lawfully manufactured and marketed in one Member State must be allowed free entry into other Member
States. In cases where harmonisation of regulations and standards is not considered essential from either a health/safety
or an industrial point of view, immediate and full recognition
of differing quality standards, food composition rules, etc.
must be the rule.... (The importer into the importing Member State) must not be required to submit such a product to
additional technical tests nor to certification procedures in
the importing State. 57

Consistent with these positions, the Commission brought
suit against Germany for, inter alia,violation of Articles 59 and 60
of the Treaty, pertaining to the free movement of insurance services. 5 8 Germany required non-German Community insurers to
be established in Germany and to obtain a new authorization
from German authorities before they could sell insurance in
Germany. The Court held that the requirement of establishment in Germany violated the Treaty but that the authorization
requirement did not.5 9 The Court used what has become known
as the "general good" exception to validate the German authorization requirement. The Court acknowledged that the German
authorization requirements "constitute restrictions on the freedom to provide services inasmuch as they increase the cost of
such services in the State in which they are provided," 60 but it
ruled that the requirements were 'justified on grounds relating
to the protection of the consumer both as a policy-holder and as
an insured person ....
The Court's construction of the "general good" exception
can be summarized as follows:
The freedom of movement of services is a fundamental principle of the Treaty that may be restricted only
0 by provisions justified by an "imperative reason" that quali62
fies as a general good;

57. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the
European Council, COM 310,
77 (June 28, 1985) [hereinafter 1985 White Paper].
58. See Commission v. Germany, Case 205/84, [1986] E.C.R. 3755, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 69; see also BERMANN ET AL., supra note 12, at 673.

59. Germany, [1986] E.C.R. 3755,
27, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69.
60. Id. 28.
61. See id. 46.
62. See id.
27 & 29. As an interesting side note, it appears that when a provision
"is the very negation" of the freedom to provide services, the Court sets an even higher
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if there is an absence of harmonization at the Community
63
level in the field under consideration;
if the provisions are nondiscriminatory;6 4
if the interest is not safeguarded by provisions to which
the out-of-State provider of a service
is subject in the Mem65
ber State of his establishment;
if the provisions are appropriate in order to protect the
interest that is a general good (appropriateness);66 and
if the provisions are necessary for achieving the "general
good" objective, i.e., the same results cannot be obtained
by less restrictive rules (proportionality).67

The Court also stated that it would look at the nature of the
services involved in each case. 6" The Court determined that the
insurance industry "was a particularly sensitive area."6 9 The
Court found that the Insurance industry is a complex field involving complex contracts between the insurer and the policy
owner. The contracts are always standardized, leaving the policy
holder no room for negotiation. The insurer is usually a great
deal more sophisticated than the consumer. The consumer risks
grave loss if the policy does not pay promptly. Performance by
the insurer can be required many years in the future. Furthermore, the financial condition of the insurer at the time of the

execution of the insurance contract and certainly in the future is
difficult to determine. Finally, insurance is a mass phenomenon,
and the administration of the service affects large numbers of
people.7 v
It was obvious from this case that the insurance industry and

the Commission would have to deal with the "general good" exstandard. Id. 52. The provision must be "indispensable for attaining the objective
pursued." Id. 9 52.
63. See id. 1 36; see also Pubblico v. Ratti, Case C-148/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1629; BERMANN ET AL., supra note 12, at 556.

64. See Germany, [1986] E.C.R. 3755, 9127, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69.
65. See id. 91127 & 29.
66. See id. 27.
67. See id. 11 29 & 41; see also Reinhard Gebhard, Case C-55/94, [1995] E.C.R. I4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603; Commission Interpretative Communication Concerning
the Free Movement of Services across Frontiers, O.J. C 334/3 (1993) [hereinafter 1993
Commission Interpretive Communication]; Michel Tison, Unraveling the General Good
Exception: The Case of FinancialServices, in SERICES AND FREE MOVEMENT IN EU LAw 340

(Mads Andenas & Wulf-Henning Roth eds., 2002).
68. See Germany, [1986] E.C.R. 3755, 1 27, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69.
69. Id. 30.
70. See id. 91 27, 30-31.
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ception at any time they sought to craft directives attempting to
supervise the industry. However, the implications for the banking industry were just as clear. The banking industry is similar to
the insurance in many ways and, like the insurance industry, is a
particularly sensitive area for the consumer. The banking industry fits all of the factors mentioned by the court in regard to the
nature of the services involved. Banking is a complex field,
many times involving complex contracts between the bank and
the consumer. Contracts are often standardized, leaving the
consumer no room for negotiation. The bank is often a great
deal more sophisticated than the consumer. The consumer risks
grave loss to a bank, both as a depositor and borrower, if the
relationship is not as the consumer may understand it. Performance by the bank can be required many years in the future. Furthermore, the financial condition of a bank at the time of a consumer's entry into a relationship with it, and certainly in the future, is difficult to determine. Finally, banking is a mass
phenomenon, and the administration of the service affects large
numbers of people. Thus, in any area not clearly covered (harmonized) by a banking directive, the banking industry was going
to have to deal with the general exception rule and with the myriad of local Member State rules that govern banking. For example, at that time no directives dealt with loan provisions, credit
ceilings, specific contract terms that might be onerous, types of
deposits that could be offered, the control of interest rates, marketing of services, whether contracts could be entered into away
from bank premises, what other services could be offered to
bank customers, or usury problems. 71 As we shall see, later directives discussed below changed some of this, but by no means
eliminated the opportunity of the Court to use the "general
good" exception in all areas.
III. THE LATE 1980s IN LIGHT OF
COMMISSION V. GERMANY
The Commission's 1985 White Paper on Completing the Internal Market called for a new approach to create a common
market in several areas, including the financial area. It referred
favorably to the Cassis de Dijon decision and the Commission's
71. See Dermine, supra note 40, at 12 (discussing the limitations on Member State
limits on banks in the early 1980s).
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interpretation of that case in 1980.72 As stated above,7 the Commission considered the approval of goods by the Member State
in which the goods were manufactured to be sufficient protection for consumers in another Member State of the Community.
That is, home country control was sufficient in most situations.
Specifically, in the 1985 White Paper it stated that:
The Commission considers that it should be possible to facilitate the exchange of such "financial products" at a Community level, using a minimal coordination of rules (especially
on such matters as authorisation, financial supervision and reorganization, winding up, etc) as the basis for mutual recognition by Member States of what each does to safeguard the
interests of the public.... Such harmonisation, particularly
as regards the supervision of ongoing activities, should be
74
guided by the principle of "home country control."
Consistent with the 1985 White Paper, the Council passed
the Second Banking Directive for the development of the internal market in banking in 1989. 7 5 The directive primarily used
the two tactics set out in the 1985 White Paper: minimum harmonization of essential standards and home State control.7 6 In
theory, once the Council has passed minimum harmonization
legislation in a field, a host Member State is no longer entitled to
invoke the "general good" exception in that field in order to
justify the application of its own laws against a foreign service
provider.7 7
Thus, in the directive Articles 4 and 5 harmonized authorization conditions. That is, a Member State could not authorize
banks with less than C5 million, or in particular categories, less
72. See 1980 Communication from the Commission, supra note 56.
73. See Dernine,supra note 40, at 10.
74. 1985 White Paper, supra note 57,
102-03.
75. See Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989, OJ. L 386/1
(1989) (on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating
to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC), later codified in Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 20 March 2000, O.J. L 126/1 (2000) (relating to the taking up
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions) [hereinafter Second Banking Directive].
76. See id. Recital
12, O.J. L 126/1 (2000).
77. See Tison, supra note 67, at 321-81; see also 1993 Commission Interpretive Communication, supra note 67.
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than C1 million. v8 A Member State also had to require that a
bank notify it of individuals and other entities that had large
holdings in the bank before the bank received authorization.
The Member State could issue an authorization then only if the
shareholders or members were suitable. v9 Article 6 prohibited
host Member States from requiring authorization or endowment
capital for branches from other Member States. In regard to an
existing bank, Article 11 required any party who wished to obtain a large holding in the bank or increase her holdings to receive approval from the home State. Article 10 harmonized
rules concerning the right of banks to continue in business. In
particularly, "own funds" normally could not fall below the
amount of initial capital required in Article 4. Article 12 generally limited holdings by a bank in non-financial institutions to
15% of the bank's own funds. Article 13 gave the home Member
State authority over the prudential supervision of a credit institution. Article 16 harmonized confidentiality requirements. Article 18 permitted transborder services without branching. The
directive also initiated a new key policy by setting forth activities
that a bank could provide in any Member State in which it was
not headquartered, the universal banking activities.8 0 Applying
the principle of subsidiarity, the directive allowed the home
State to establish stricter rules than required by the directive in
several areas, including the three mentioned above in Articles 4,
10, and 12.81
In spite of these tactics, in the Preamble and several different articles in the directive, the Council recognized the host
State's right to exercise powers over a branch of a bank from
another Member State in the name of the general good. 82 Article 19(4) required a host State to notify a credit institution of
any conditions it must meet to satisfy an interest of the general
good in order to commence activities in that State. Article
21(11) allowed a host State to impose restrictions on a bank's
advertising in the interest of the general good. However, Article
78. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 75, arts. 4(1) & (2), O.J. L 126/1
(2000).
79. See id. art. 5, O.J. L 126/1 (2000).
80. See id. art. 18, Annex
1-14, O.J. L 126/1 (2000); see also BERMANN ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 1194-97.
81. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 75, Recital
8, O.J. L 126/1 (2000).
82. See id. Recitals
16 & 17, arts. 19(4), 21(5)-21(11), O.J. L 126/1 (2000).
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21 (5) appears to be the most sweeping use of the "general good"
exception. It permitted host States to enforce any "legal rules
adopted in the interest of the general good." 3
As an interesting coincidence, at about the same time the
Court of Justice was creating waves with its decision in the Commission v. Germany case, the European Community, the Commission, and the Council began a series of communications, resolutions, regulations, directives, and treaty provisions in the consumer protection area, including consumer credit protection,
that turned into an avalanche of legislation that has not slowed
down even today.
The Single European Act 8 4 was adopted in 1986. This facili-

tated legislation to achieve the internal market by adding Article
100a, which provides for the use of a qualified majority by the
Council in order to adopt actions which "have as their object the
establishment and functioning of the internal market."8 5 Further banking law and consumer protection legislation was in
turn facilitated because in both fields the establishment of the
internal market under Article 100a was often used as the basis
for legislation. The Article also codified the principle that the
Commission in its proposals "will take as a base a high level of
protection" concerning, among other matters, consumer protection.

86

In 1987, the Council adopted its first Directive that specifically applied the principles of consumer protection to the banking industry (as well as other financial service industries). The
1987 Consumer Credit Directive8 7 was adopted by use of the recently added Article 100a of the E.C. Treaty. It stated that the
wide differences in the laws of the Member States concerning
consumer credit hurt the free movement of goods and services
and limited the functioning of the common market.8 8 The con83. Id. art. 21(5), O.J. L 126/1 (2000).
84. See Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA] (amending Treaty establishing the European Economic Commuity, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11).
85. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 95(1), O.J. C 325/1 (2002).
86. Id. art. 100(a)(3), OJ. C 325/1 (2002).
87. Council Directive 87/102, OJ. L 42/48 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Consumer
Credit Directive] (Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the Member States
concerning consumer).
1-4, O.J. L 42/48 (1987).
88. See id. Recital
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sumer should be protected against unfair credit terms, and harmonization of the general conditions governing consumer credit
should be undertaken as a priority."9 This Directive allowed the
Member States to set more stringent laws." ° It dealt primarily
with the calculation of the annual percentage rate, which had to
be disclosed to the consumer.9 ' However, it also dealt with,
among other things, the harmonization of consumer credit contracts, 9 2 prepayment rules, 3 rules concerning the relationship of
the parties during the existence of the contract, 94 and defenses
consumers can raise. 95 It required Member States to ensure that
entities offering credit were properly established and supervised. 96
At the end of the 1980s one can begin to see a pattern in
regard to the relationship between consumer protection policies
and the banking internal market. In the 1970s the Council and
Commission would have preferred that the financial internal
market, including banking, be strengthened by use of harmonization.9 7 In the 1985 White Paper this strategy was modified to
include home country control, along with minimum harmonization. 98 At the same time the Court ofJustice used the gaps left in
the harmonization of the banking industry as openings to apply
the "general good" exception. The Commission and the Council also started adopting consumer protection measures for the
entire Community, partly in order to encourage the free movement of goods and services, which might otherwise be limited by
diverse national consumer protection rules. Thus, national consumer protection rules were a hindrance to the development of
the internal market; yet, at the same time, consumer protection
became a goal of the Community in its effort to strengthen the
internal market.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See id. Recital 1 5, O.J. L 42/48 (1987).
See id. art. 15, O.J. L 42/48 (1987).
See id. art. 4(2) (a), O.J. L 42/48 (1987).
See id. art. 4, O.J. L 42/48 (1987).
See id. art. 8, O.J. L 42/48 (1987).
See id. arts. 6(2) & (3), Oj. L 42/48 (1987).
See id. art. 9, O.J. L 42/48 (1987).
See id. art. 12, O.J. L 42/48 (1987).
See First Banking Directive, supra note 1, O.J. L 322/30 (1977).
See 1985 white Paper, supra note 57.
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IV. THE 1990s
A. Legislation
In 1992, the European Community adopted the Treaty of
Maastricht, which substantially amended the E.C. Treaty.9 9 The
Treaty of Maastricht implemented massive changes in the relationship of the European Community Nations. However, it did
little to develop consumer protection policy in regard to the provision of financial services. The Treaty of Maastricht did generally highlight the importance of consumer protection, introducing a new E.C. Treaty Article 129a on consumer interests, which
directed the Community to contribute to "protecting the health,
safety and economic interests of consumers." 10 Also, Article 3,
which lists the fields of Community activities, was amended to
include Article 3(s) which stated that the activities of the Community will include "a contribution to the strengthening of consumer protection...

"101

Article 129(a) stated that the Commu-

nity (1) "shall contribute to the attainment of a high level of
consumer protection, '"102 (2) shall take into account consumer
protection "in defining and implementing other Community
policies and activities, " °3 and (3) shall adopt measures to attain
the above objectives through measures to complete the internal
market.10 4 However, it appears that the E.C. Treaty limited the
Community's ability to enact legislation that has as its goal the
outright insurance of a high level of consumer protection by stating in Paragraph 3(b) of the Article that consumer protection
will be pursued outside the area of expansion of the internal
market only in order "to support, supplement and monitor the
policy pursued by the Member States."' ' In addition, the Member States retained the right to enact more stringent protective
measures than those adopted by the Community pursuant to
99. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, as amended by SEA, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741). The TEU
was signed at Maastricht, the Netherlands, on February 7, 1992, and entered into force
on November 1, 1993.
100. Id. art. 129a, O.J. C 224/1 (1992).
101. Id. art. 3(s), OJ. C 224/1 (1992).
102. Id. art. 129a(1), O.J. C 224/1 (1992).
103. Id. art. 129a(2), O.J. C 224/1 (1992).
104. See id. art. 129a(3) (a), O.J. C 224/1 (1992).
105. Id. art. 129a(3)(b), O.J. C 224/1 (1992).
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Paragraph 3(b). The result is that any strong consumer protection legislation by the Council would still usually be based on
E.C. Treaty Article 95 (ex Article 100a), i.e., the Community's
right to establish the internal market.
In 1993, the Council adopted the Directive on unfair terms
in consumer contracts." 6 The Directive relied on Article 95 (ex
100a) for its authority."' 7 By defining seller or supplier broadly,
the Directive included contracts between banks and its individual customers." 8 This Directive had a real impact on the banking industry, but it still failed to deal with a fairly broad array of
bank activities. Article 3 for the most part limited the application of the directive to pre-formulated standard contracts (such
as, in the banking sector, loan agreements and surety agreements). 1°9 Furthermore, the Directive left loopholes for the
creditor. For example, Article 4 set out a general rule concerning the determination whether a contract was unfair. The party
making the determination was to take into account the nature of
the services to be rendered by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract to, "all circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all other terms of the contract or of
another contract on which it is dependent." '
However, the
price, as opposed to the services supplied, was not to be considered if the terms were in plain language. The Directive adopted
an annex that contained "an indicative and non-exhaustive" list
of the terms it regarded as unfair."1 Subparagraphs (g) and (j)
of the Annex prohibited the supplier from having contract provisions terminating a contract without reasonable notice or enabling the supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally
without a valid reason, 1 2 but these Subparagraphs were limited
by Subparagraphs 2(a) and (b). These two Subparagraphs applied specifically to financial services. Subparagraph (a) allowed
a supplier to terminate a contract without notice for a "valid reason" if the consumer is notified immediately thereafter."' Sub106. See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, O.J. L 95/29 (1993) (on unfair terms in
consumer contracts).
107. See id. pmbl.
1, O.J. L 95/29 (1993).
108. See id. art. 2(c), O.J. L 95/29 (1993).
109. See id. art. 3, O.J. L 95/29 (1993).
110. Id. art. 4(1), O.J. L 95/29 (1993).
111. See id. art. 3(3), O.J. L 95/29 (1993).
112. See id. Annex
i(g) & (j), O.J. L 95/29 (1993).
113. See id. Annex
2(a), OJ. L 95/29 (1993).

1234

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 28:1216

paragraph (b) permitted the supplier to alter interest rates and
other charges without notice for a "valid reason" if the consumer
is notified at the earliest opportunity thereafter and the con14
sumer can dissolve the contract immediately.'
Notwithstanding the above, the Directive contained some
quite valuable provisions. The Annex prohibited terms of a contract that, among other things, required a consumer to pay a
disproportionately high sum if the consumer failed to fulfill his
obligations under the contract," 5 irrevocably bound the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract, 1 6 enabled
the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid reason specified in the contract," 7 or hindered the right of the consumer to take legal action or exercise
other legal remedies."' In the banking area, these provisions
limited a bank's power to charge high default fees, limited the
bank's ability to unilaterally modify loan and deposit agreements
and prevented the bank from inserting provisions by which a
borrower or depositor could not seek legal remedies for bank
defaults.
The Directive was not intended to assist in the creation of
the internal market for the banking industry. Partial harmonization was the method by which the Council stated it chose to implement the rules set out in the Directive."' The Directive, by
its terms, also set a floor for the Member States to observe, and a
weak one at that. In Paragraph 13 of the recitals to the directive,
the Council "presumed" that the contractual provisions that any
Member State required in contracts covered by the Directive did
not contain unfair terms. 2 Article 1 of the Directive specifically
stated that such provisions were not subject to the Directive. 2 '
In Article 8, the directive stated that the Member States could
adopt or retain "the most stringent provisions compatible with
the Treaty in the area covered by this Directive .... 122 The
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
Id.

id. Annex 1 2(b), O.J. L 95/29 (1993).
id. Annex
1(e), O.J. L 95/29 (1993).
id. Annex
1(i), 0.J. L 95/29 (1993).
id. Annex
1(j), O.J. L 95/29 (1993).
id. Annex
I1(q), 0.J. L 95/29 (1993).
id. Recital 12, O.J, L 95/29 (1993); see also art. 1 (1), O.J. L 95/29 (1993).
id. Recital 9 13, 0.J. L 95/29 (1993).
id. art. 1(2), O.J. L 95/29 (1993).
art. 8, O.J. L 95/29 (1993).
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result is that, although the Directive is important because it recognized certain minimum requirements in consumer contracts,
it did not go very far to prevent Member States from permitting
banks to use standard form contracts with consumers whose
terms might vary considerably from State to State, so long as the
terms did not clearly violate consumer protection provisions.
The Council issued the Directive on Cross-border Credit
Transfers ("DCCT") in 1997.128 One purpose of the DCCT was
to establish "the minimum requirements needed to ensure an
adequate level of customer information both before and after
the execution of a cross-border credit transfer.' 1 24 The DCCT
included complaint and redress procedures for customers, together with the arrangements for access thereto. 1 25 It also established minimum execution requirements which institutions offering cross-border credit transfer services should adhere to, including the obligation to execute a cross-border credit transfer
in accordance with the customer's instructions. 126 This Directive
was followed by an even stronger regulation on the Euro in
2001,127 by which the Council and Parliament mandated that,
among other things, charges for cross-border payments in euro
were to be the same as payments within a Member State. 12 ' The
regulation applies to payments up to C12,500 (effective January
1, 2006, C50,000) within the Community, but does not apply1 to
29
payments made between institutions for their own accounts.
inforIt also required institutions to provide customers certain
1 30
mation about their charges and the changes thereto.
B. The Court of Justice
In the 1990s, the Court of Justice provided new guidance in
regard to the "general good" exception. In 1991, in the Commission v. Franceand Sager v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd. cases, the Court
made it clear that the Treaty provisions prohibited all (even non123. Directive 97/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, O.J. L
43/25 (1997) (on cross-border credit transfers).
124. Id. Recital 8, Oj. L 43/25 (1997).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Regulation (EC) No. 2560/2001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council, O.J. L 344/13 (2001) (on cross-border payments in Euro).
128. See id. art. 1, O.J. L 344/13 (2001).
129. See id. art. 3, O.J. L 344/13 (2001).
130. See id. art. 4, O.J. L 344/13 (2001).
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discriminatory) restrictions on free movement of services unless
they fit within the "general good" exception.13 1 In the Commission v. Francecase, France required tourist guides accompanying
groups of tourists from another Member State to possess a license obtained normally by passing an examination. The government required the license for guides taking tourists to places
that could be visited only with a specialized professional
guide.1 3 2 In Sager, the Court applied the "general good" rule to
a case in which a party with its registered office in the United
1 33
Kingdom was providing patent renewal services in Germany.
On the other hand, the Court ruled in the Gouda v. Commissariaatvoor de Media ("Mediawet") case that even discriminatory
rules may be acceptable if "they can be brought within the scope
of an express exemption," such as public policy, public security
or public health, exemptions contained in then-Article 56 (now
Article 46)."' This ruling was made within the context of a proceeding between ten operators of cable networks and the institution responsible for supervising the operation of cable networks
in the Netherlands, the Commissariaat voor de Media. The
Commissariaat imposed a law governing the supply of radio and
television programs, radio and television license fees, and press
subsidies concerning the transmission of advertising contained
in radio or television programs broadcast from abroad.1 3 5
In the case of Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financien, 3 6 the Court made several points. The company was a

Dutch securities brokerage company making cold-calls to potential customers outside the Netherlands. The Netherlands instituted a rule that no company in the Netherlands could make
cold-calls anywhere, including calls into other Member States.
Alpine Investments had no branches anywhere but the Netherlands. The Court determined that, first, the existence of an
identifiable recipient of services was not necessary in order to
apply Article 49 concerning the provision of services.13 7 Second,
131. See Commission v. France, Case C-154/89, [1991] E.C.R 1-659; Sager v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd., Case C-76/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4221.
132. France, [1991] E.C.R 1-659,
1.
133. Sager, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4221,
15-17.
134. Gouda v. Commissariaat voor de Media, Case C-288/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4007
[hereinafter Mediawet].
135. See id. 2.
136. Case C-384/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1141, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 209.
137. See id. 19.
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the Court ruled that Article 49 covered both importing and exporting services.' 38 Third, it ruled that the Dutch rule could be
justified under the "general good" exception. 13 9 The Court, in a
sense, used two State interests to reach its decision. It stated
that, first, protection of consumers outside of the Netherlands
was not a direct interest of that State, but that such protection
does nonetheless have a direct effect on the good reputation of
Dutch financial services. The Court then held that maintaining
the good reputation of the national financial sector constitutes
an imperative reason of public interest capable of justifying restrictions on the freedom to provide financial services.1 4 ° It
stated that the prohibition of calls protected consumers and also
maintained the good reputation of the national financial sector.
The prohibition protected "investor confidence in the financial
markets of that State .... "1141
In response, Alpine Investments asserted that, even so, the
measures taken by the Netherlands were not necessary to protect
consumers (i.e., they were not proportional). It pointed to a less
restrictive rule in the United Kingdom. That rule only required
the calling company to record its unsolicited calls. In response,
the Court ruled that, among other things, "the fact that one
Member State imposes less strict rules than another Member
State does not mean that the latter's rules are disproportionate
and hence incompatible with Community Law." 1 4 2 That is, just
because one Member State's laws are stricter than another does
not mean the stricter law is automatically disproportionate when
analyzing the proportionality factor in the "general good" exception.
In the process of making these rulings, the Court created an
additional question: would the nature of the financial services
and products to be provided and the level of sophistication of
the consumer be factors in applying the "general good" excep138. See id. 31.
139. See id. 56.
140. See id. 43.
141. Id. 50.
142. Id. 51. See Criminal Proceedings Against Mac Quen, Case C-108/96, [2001]
E.C.R. 1-837, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 29. It is interesting to note that if the Court had not
ruled that the Netherlands prohibition was acceptable under the general good exception, at some later point it would probably have had to make a decision about the U.K.
rule and possibly strike down the U.K. rule.
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tion? "4'

As discussed above, in the Commission v. Germany case,
the Court had stated that they might be. The issue came up
again in this case without full resolution.
In the Parodiv. Banque de Bary case, the Court confirmed the
application of the "general good" exception to banking services.' 4 4 More importantly, it seems to have resolved the issue
concerning the nature of the service and the sophistication of
the consumer. In Parodi, a Dutch Bank in Amsterdam made a
loan to a French company ("Parodi") in 1984. At the time, there
was a French law that required foreign banks to be registered in
order to supply banking services. The Dutch bank was not registered. The First Banking Directive was in effect, but the Second
Banking Directive had not yet taken effect.
In 1990, Parodi brought an action against the bank to have
the loan declared void. The Court in this case was not asked to
make a determinative ruling on the facts but was only asked to
establish the criteria by which the national court could make its
decision. 1 45 The Court held that the French law would violate
Article 49 (ex Article 59) of the E.C. Treaty in regard to the freedom of movement of services unless, in effect, it met the criteria
of the "general good" exception.' 4 6 The Court indicated that
consumer protection was a general good, but it pointed out that
even so the rule had to be necessary to protect the recipient of
services (i.e., appropriate). The Court indicated here that the
French rule seemed to be more for the protection of a saver/
depositor rather than a borrower.1 47 In addition, the Court
made it clear that "a distinction must be drawn according to the
nature of the banking activity in question and of the risk incurred by the person for whom the service is intended.' 1

48

The

Court pointedly indicated that the State may have less interest in
protecting some types of borrowers (here a sophisticated company) than others.

149

143. See id. 42.
144. Case C-222/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3899, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 29.
145. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 234, O.J. C 325/1 (2002).
146. See Parodi, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3899,
32, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 29.
147. See id. 28.
148. Id. 29.
149. See id. One might assume that, based on the Court's analysis, the French
court would hold that the French rule did not satisfy the conditions set out by the Court
and, thus, rule in favor of the bank. This was not the case. The French court later
ruled in favor of Alpine Investments. See Tison, supra note 67, at 341.
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The Commission has interpreted this position to be that it is
necessary to give consideration, in each individual case, to the
need for protection of the recipient of the banking services offered by examining the nature of the service and the level of
sophistication of the recipient. 15 1 "In other words, in order to
respect the principle of proportionality, they (the Member
States) should take account of the degree of vulnerability of the
person they are setting out to protect."1 5 ' Thus, in the banking
area, as well as in other financial service areas, one might assume
that rules that tend to protect the more vulnerable are more
likely to be enforced under the "general good" exception than
rules that protect the more sophisticated.
The Court in the Parodicase, however, did not stop with the
above ruling. It seemed to imply that its ruling resulted from the
fact that the "general good" exception should be applied only
because the First Banking Directive imposed certain minimum
conditions on the Member States.1 5 2 The First Banking Directive
was only a first step toward "mutual recognition by Member
[S] tates of authorizations issued by each of them to credit institutions. It is common ground that such mutual recognition was
made possible only by the entry into force of" the Second Banking Directive. 15' Assuming that this interpretation of the Court's
reasoning is correct, Sideek Mohamed, Associate Professor of
Law, Stockholm University, 154 has asserted that the Court should
be (and has been) stricter in allowing such national rules intended for some general good after the passage of the Second
155
Banking Directive.
In two cases involving banking activities that have been decided since the Parodi case, the Court has ruled that national
measures have violated one of the "freedoms." In the Criminal

150. See Commission Interpretive Communication: Freedom to provide Services
and the Interest of the General Good in the Second Banking Directive, SEC (97) 1193
Final (June 20, 1997).
151. Id. 1 24-25.
152. See id. 25.
153. Id. 24.
154. See Staff Catalogue, Department of Law, Stockholm University, available at
http://www.juridicum.su.se/jurweb/kontakt/person.asp?lang=eng&personid=91.
155. See Sideek Mohamed, Consumer Protection in the EC FinancialMarket, 8 CONSUMER L.J. 383 (2001).
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French law required that

if a travel agent had obtained a bank guarantee from a nonFrench bank in order to secure its activities, the non-French
bank had to further obtain an agreement from a French institution assuring the availability of funds. The Court ruled that the
French law violated both Article 49 of the Treaty concerning the
freedom of services and the right to provide services under the
Second Banking Directive.1" 7 The law discouraged financial institutions established in other Member States from offering the
security required directly to a travel agent in France. The Court
then looked at the factors concerning whether the law could be
justified as a protection of consumers (i.e., did the "general
good" exception apply). The Court stated that the law could not
be justified in that it applied the requirement of security not
only to guaranty the repatriation of travelers, but also applied
the requirement to all securities provided by credit institutions
and insurance companies in the Member States. 15' The law was,
therefore, "not commensurate to the objective pursued" (i.e.,
not proportional). In addition, the Court ruled that even the
portion of the law that might apply to providing security for the
repatriation of travelers was not justified because funds can be
159
made available between European banks very quickly.
In the Caixa-Bank France v. Ministere de l'Economie, des Finances et de 1'Industrie case, France prohibited banks established
in France from paying interest on demand accounts. The Court
ruled that the application of this prohibition against a subsidiary
of a Spanish bank established in France violated the freedom of
establishment provisions of the Treaty.16 ° To justify the law's restriction on freedom of establishment, the French Government
asserted that the law, among other things, protected consumers.
It asserted "that the prohibition was necessary for maintaining
the provision of basic banking services without charge. Introducing remuneration for sight accounts would substantially in156. Case C-410/96, [1998] E.C.R_ 1-7875 (Dec. 1, 1998) (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Metz).
157. See id. 39.
158. See id. 33-34.
159. See id. 36.
160. See Caixa-Bank France v. Ministere de l'Economie, des Finances et de
l'Industrie, Case C-442/02, [2004] E.C.R. _, available at http://europa.eu.int/
smartapi/cgi/sgadoc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg-en&numdoc=6200
2J0442.
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crease the operating costs of banks, which, to recover those
costs, would increase charges and introduce charges for the various banking services currently provided free, in particular the
issuing of cheques.' 1 6 1 The Court, however, stated that the mea-

sure went beyond what is necessary to attain its objective. 6 2 The
Court speculated that a more appropriate approach to the problem might be to allow "consumers to choose between an unremunerated sight account with certain basic banking services
remaining free of charge and a remunerated sight account with
the credit institution being able to make charges for banking
services previously provided free, such as the issuing of cheques."1

63

In other words, no law at all might be the proportion-

ate response to the problem, leaving the issue to the market.
It should be noted that neither case modified the factors to
consider regarding the "general good" exception. The Court
merely applied the proportionality element of the exception to
the pertinent law and found that law too broad. Of course, one
could argue that the Court applied the facts in the cases more
stringently against the exception, but it is hard to support that
argument in these cases. Both involved fairly weak arguments in
favor of the position that the laws in question gave any real protection to the consumer. They appeared to be more likely to
protect local financial interests. Even so, these two cases alone
probably are not enough to indicate a trend in the Court's rulings. For example, in the non-banking case of Reisburo Broede v.
Gerd Sandke,'6 4 a German statute prohibited certain debt collection services without the representation of an attorney. A
French collection service was attempting to use its managing director in Germany, a non-lawyer, to collect certain debts. The
actions were dismissed since no attorney represented the service.' 6 5 The Court of Justice ruled that the law in question was a
restriction of the freedom to provide services. 1 66 However, it
161. Id. 1 20.
162. See id. 21.
163. Id. 1 22.
164. Case C-3/95, [1996] E.C.R. 1-6511. See Salomone Haim v. Kassenzahnarztliche
Vereinigung Nordrhein, Case C-424/97, [2000] E.C.R. 1-5123, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 11 in
which the court recognized the application of the "general good" exception in a case in
which the State governmental authority required a dental practitioner to have certain
linguistic abilities. See id.
165. See id.
11.
166. See id.
27.

61.
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stated that the law was justified by the "general good" exception,
the general good being the protection of creditors or safeguarding "the sound administration of justice in relation to the provision of litigation services on a professional basis. "167 The Court
rejected the arguments that the law was not proportional or ap168
propriate.
During this period the Commission issued two Communications concerning the provision of services across Member State
lines that dealt with the banking industry. In 1993, the Commission issued the Commission Interpretive Communication Concerning
the Free Movement of Services across Frontiers ("1993 Communication"). ' In 1997, it issued the Commission Interpretive Communication: Freedom to provide Services and the Interest of the General Good in
the Second Banking Directive ("1997 Communication").17' Both of
these communications interpreted the Court's position concerning the "general good" exception. Neither communication criticized the Court or its rulings in any way. However, both broadly
interpreted the Treaty provisions creating the freedom to provide services and, in the case of the 1997 Communication, the freedom of establishment, and narrowly interpreted the "general
good" exception. For example, in the 1993 Communication, the
Commission went to some length to clarify that the prohibition
on restrictions on the free movement of services applied to any
restriction, even if non-discriminatory, if it was "liable to prohibit
or otherwise impede the activities of the provider of services established in another Member State." 171 The Commission then
re-emphasized the point by asserting that this means that the
prohibition "covers any measure which might hinder trade in
services between Member States."' 72 The Communication then
lists those State interests justifying a "general good" exception
(e.g., consumer protection, protection of workers, etc. 173 ) and
spends the remainder of the Communication emphasizing that
167. Id. 36.
168. See id. 40.
169. Commission Interpretative Communication Concerning the Free Movement
of Services across Frontiers, O.J. C 334/3 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Communication].
170. Commission Interpretive Communication: Freedom to provide Services and
the Interest of the General Good in the Second Banking Directive, SEC (97) 1193 Final
(June 20, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Communication].
171. 1993 Communication, supra note 169, § III. 1.
172. Id.
173. See id. § 111.2. (a).
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the Court will not recognize local Member States restrictions on
free movement of services if the public interest is already protected by rules of the State of establishment or if the result
achieved by the restriction cannot be obtained by less restrictive
rules."1 74
The 1997 Communication is broader than its 1993 predecessor. It deals with both the free movement of services and the
freedom of establishment. 175 However, in the sections dealing
specifically with the application of rules adopted in the interest
of the general good, it seems to give the same message as the
1993 Communication. For example, in its analysis of the factors to
consider in order to determine whether to apply the "general
good" exception (lack of harmonization, proportionality, etc.),
of
the Commission emphasized the need to examine the "nature 176
the services and the level of sophistication of the recipient.
The Commission stated that there may be circumstances in
which a more sophisticated customer would need less protection
than others or that there may be transactions in which less protection is needed.1 7 7 The Commission even gave a short tutorial
on the procedures by which an institution can challenge a national measure that restricts a freedom that the institution considers unjustified.1 7
One should also keep in mind that one can argue that the
"general good" exception, as set out by the Court, is becoming a
narrow exception in the financial services context. Consider the
following. First, any Member State rule restricting the freedom
of movement of services or the freedom of establishment must
meet all six of the factors dealing with lack of harmonization,
proportionality, appropriateness, etc., 179 in order to fall under
the exception. As stated above, 180 there is also some reason to
believe that the Court is applying these criteria more strictly
against the State restrictions. Second, the Court has stated that
174. Id. § III.2.(b) & (c).
175. 1997 Communication, supra note 170, pt. II, § B.
176. Id.
177. See id. For example, the Commission adopted a concept of the European
Parliament and Council Directive 94/19/EC on deposit guarantees described as a "circumspect recipient of services." OJ. L 135/5 (1994).
178. See European Parliament and Council Directive 94/19/EC, OJ. L 135/5
(1994).
179. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
180. See Mohamed, supra note 155, at 389-91.
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it would look at the nature of the services involved in each
case. 8 1 As suggested by the 1997 Communication, the Court may
use this tactic to exempt certain categories of consumers from
the need for protection. Finally, with the increased number of
directives that were passed in the banking and consumer protection areas in the 1990s, there are simply fewer areas that are not
harmonized and that, therefore, are open to Member State restrictions that might qualify under the "general good" exception.
The next section of this Article is an example as to where the
Commission may be headed in that regard.
V. CURRENT CONSUMER PROTECTIONPROPOSALS
In 2002, the Commission issued a Communication on Consumer Policy Strategyfor 2002-2006, "2 which asserted that in order
to ensure a high level of consumer protection, eliminate barriers
to cross-border trade and encourage cross-border shopping, the
Community:
must go further to enable consumers and business to realize
the benefits of the internal market. Central to this idea was
the establishment of common consumer protection rules and
practices across Europe. This meant moving away from the
situation of different sets of rules in each Member State towards a more consistent
environment for consumer protec83
tion across the EU.1
The Commission went on to state:
There is also a need to review and reform existing EU consumer protection directives, to bring them up to date and
progressively adapt them from minimum harmonization to
"full harmonization" measures. The Green Paper and the
Commission's Strategy on Services make it clear that the simple application of mutual recognition, without harmonization, is not likely to be appropriate for such consumer protection issues. However, provided a sufficient degree of harmonization is achieved, the country of origin approach could be
1 84
applied to remaining questions.
181. See Commission v. Germany, Case 205/84, [1986] E.C.R. 3755, 27, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 69.
182. See Communication on Consumer Policy Strategy for 2002-2006, COM (2002)
208 Final.
183. Id. 3.1.
184. See id. 3.1.2.1.
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Consistent with this position, in 2002 and 2003, the Commission proposed two consumer protection directives that, if
passed, will have a significant effect on the banking industry of
the European Community. These two proposals were for a directive on the harmonization of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions concerning credit for consumers1 8 and
for a directive concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices.'8 6
The proposals emphasize the weakness of both partial harmonization and the use of minimum clauses in prior directives.
In the Consumer Credit Proposal,the Commission states that it is
attempting to establish an internal market with no local exceptions.'
The method by which the Commission wishes to meet
its goal is maximum harmonization. "All types and forms of
credit that are available to private individuals will, in principle,
be harmonised."' 8 This position is brought home 8in9 no uncertain terms by Article 30 of the proposed Directive.1
The Unfair Commercial Practices Proposals criticism is even
stronger. It acknowledges unfair commercial practices can create barriers to the functioning of the internal market.' 9° Such
practices undermine consumer confidence, impair the consumer's ability to make informed choices, and give the trader
acting unfairly an advantage over the party who is playing by the
rules. 9 ' The Unfair Commercial PracticesProposal, however, goes
one step further. It states that the Member State consumer protection laws can also exacerbate these barriers to the functioning
of the internal market. "The minimum clauses in existing consumer protection legislation . . . perpetuate this problem by allowing Member States to add divergent requirements and pro185. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Harmonisation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the
Member States Concerning Credit for Consumers, COM (2002) 0443 Final, O.J. C 331/
200 (2002) [hereinafter Consumer Credit Proposal].
186. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market
and Amending Directives 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC, COM (2003) 0356
Final [hereinafter Unfair Commercial Practices Proposal].
187. See id. Explanatory Memorandum,
2.2.
188. Id. Explanatory Memorandum,
3.
189. See id. art. 30.
190. See Unfair Commercial Practices Proposal, supra note 186,
14.
191. See id.
15 & 16.
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vide differing degrees and types of protection." '9 2 The scope
and application of the Member States' general legal principles
regulating marketing and unfair commercial practices vary
widely.19 3 This "complex patchwork of different national requirements adds costs to those who market cross-border and for
'
In a
many is such a deterrent that they simply do not try."194
the
proposal
exception,
clear reference to the "general good"
states that:
In the absence of uniform rules at the Community level, obstacles to cross-border services and goods or the freedom of
establishment could be justified in the light of the case-law of
the Court ofJustice as long as they seek to protect recognized
objectives and are proportionate to those
public interest
195
objectives.

The Commission asserts that these obstacles should be eliminated "by establishing uniform rules at Community level to the
extent necessary for the proper functioning of the Internal Market and to meet the requirement of legal certainty."1 9 6 The
Commission leaves no doubt about its intent to fully harmonize
the entire field of commercial practices.' 9 7
The result is that in the Unfair Commercial Practices Proposal
the Commission has proposed general principles and some necessary specific legislation that attempt "full harmonization" and
provisions "for mutual recognition based on the country of origin. " "' The Unfair Commercial Practices Proposal asserts that
"Member States will not be able to use the minimum clauses in
other directives to impose additional requirements in the field
coordinated by this Directive."199
The Consumer Credit Proposalwas finalized in 2002. The proposed Directive is intended to replace the 1987 Consumer
Credit Directive and will repeal it.2 0 It covers loan agree192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. 19.
See id. 20.
Id. 22.
Id. (4).
Id.
See id. Explanatory Memorandum,
Id. 26.
Id. 30.

200. See id. art. 36.

44 & 45.
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ments. 2° ' An agreement can be either a form agreement or individually prepared.2 °2 The proposed directive does have important exceptions, e.g., no coverage for: (1) agreements which
grant credit for the purchase or transformation of real estate
that the consumer owns or is seeking to acquire and which are
secured by a mortgage; (2) employment agreements; (3) shortterm (three months or less) credit agreements that charge no
interest or fees; (4) credit agreements granted by a creditor
outside the scope of his principal activity at lower than market
rates, which are not offered to the public; and (5) credit agreements concluded with investment firms for the purpose of allowing an investor to carry out a transaction.
The proposed Directive would apply to both credit and
surety agreements. 2°3 Article 4 requires advertising to be clear
and comprehensible. Article 5 is an outright ban on the negotiation of credit or surety agreements outside business premises.
Article 6, Paragraph 2, states that the creditor may obtain
appropriate information about the consumer 20 4 and must provide certain specified information in writing about the credit
20 5
agreement to the consumer.
The proposed Directive would also require that the creditor
establish among the products offered by the creditor, and advise
the consumer about, what would be the most appropriate type of
product and most appropriate total amount of credit for the
consumer, taking into consideration: (1) the financial situation
of the consumer; (2) the advantages and disadvantages of the
product proposed; and (3) the purpose of the credit. 20 6 The
creditor should assess, "by any means at his disposal, whether the
consumer.., can reasonably be expected to discharge" his obli20 7
gation.
Each Member State would be required to establish a central
database of consumers who have defaulted on loans and re201. See Consumer Credit Proposal, supra note 185, art. 1(c), O.J. C 331/200
(2002).
202. See id. art. 2(c).
203. See id. art. 3,
1.
204. This information may only be used "for the purpose of assessing the financial
situation of those persons and their ability to repay." Id. art. 7.
205. See id. art. 6,
2.
206. See id. art. 6,
3; see also id. Explanatory Memorandum,
3 (Examination of
the Articles, Article 6).
207. Id. art. 9.
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quires the creditor to consult the database prior to making each
loan. 20 8 Article 10 sets out certain specified provisions that must
be in the credit agreement. Under Article 11, the consumer has
a fourteen day right of withdrawal.20 9
One of the most important set of provisions in the proposed
directive is the standardization of the calculation of interest rates
that the creditor must use in disclosures to the consumer. There
are three rates that can be used in various situations.2 10
The proposed directive also describes what it considers unfair terms of a credit agreement, 211 and covers the right to make
early repayments. 2 12 It defines defenses against assignees of
credit instruments, 218 and sets out terms concerning the relationship of the parties upon the nonperformance of a credit
214
agreement.
The proposed directive contains additional provisions concerning lines of credit, debit accounts, and open-end credit
21 6
agreements, 2 11 the duties and rights of a guarantor or surety,
and the registration and obligations of creditors and credit intermediaries (representatives of creditors) .2 17 The registration
218
requirement does not apply to credit institutions, i.e., banks.
The result is a directive that is much more comprehensive
than the 1987 Consumer Credit Directive. Of particular interest
are: (1) the provisions that require the creditor to determine
the suitability of the credit for the consumer and to advise the
consumer as to the best course of action; (2) the effort of the
Commission to achieve maximum harmonization in the field;
(3) the creation of a central database; (4) the very detailed requirements concerning disclosure and credit agreements; and
(5) the determination of formulas for interest rates.
The Unfair CommercialPracticesProposalwas finalized in 2003.
The proposed directive covers only individual consumers but
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
Id.
Id.

id. art. 8.
id. art. 11.
id. arts. 12-14.
id. art. 15.
id. art. 16.
id. art. 17.
id. arts. 24, 26-27, 32 & 33.
id. arts. 20-22.
id. art. 23; see also arts. 2(e); 3,
arts. 28 & 29.
3.
art. 28,

1; 4-5; 8,

3, 9; 10,

3; 15 & 17.
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covers a large range of services and goods. This includes the
provision of financial services. 2 19 It does not, however, cover the
220
rules concerning the validity, formation or effect of a contract.
It does not repeal or modify the 1993 Directive on unfair terms
in consumer contracts. Article 3 states that if there is a conflict
with any other directive dealing with unfair commercial practices, the latter will prevail. 22
Article 4 states that traders will comply only with the laws of
2 22
the State in which they are established, i.e., home State rules.
Member States "shall neither restrict the freedom to provide services nor restrict the free movement of goods for reasons falling
223
within the field approximated by this Directive.
The proposed directive prohibits unfair commercial practices and sets out both a general rule defining what unfair commercial practices are and a specific list of unfair practices. Practices not in the list of unfair practices may still be ruled unfair if
they meet the criteria of the general rule.2 2 4 Under the general
rule a commercial practice is unfair if "it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, and it materially distorts or
is likely to materially distort the economic behavior with regard
to the product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to
whom it is addressed, or of the average member of the group
when a commercial practice is specifically directed to a particular group of consumers. ' 225 This general categorization is divided into two types of unfair commercial practices, misleading
commercial practices and aggressive commercial practices.2 2 6
Annex 1 of the proposed directive lists the practices that are considered unfair in all circumstances.
The proposed directive amends Directive 1984/450/EEC in
regard to comparative advertising, permitting it under certain
conditions.2 2 7 It also makes minor amendments to Directives
22
1997/7/EC (distance selling) and 1998/27/EC (injunctions). 1
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See Unfair Commercial Practices Proposal, supra note 186, arts. 2 (a) & (d).
See id. art. 3, 1 2.
See id. art. 3,
5.
See id. art. 4, 1.
Id. art. 4,
2.
See id. art. 5.
Id. art. 5
2.
See id. arts. 6-7.
See id. art. 14.
See id. arts. 15-16.
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This proposal, like the Consumer Credit Proposal, is much
more comprehensive in the area of consumer protection than
anything before it. It is interesting particularly because of its effort to fully harmonize the area of commercial practices in regard to consumer protection and because it attempts to lay out a
Community-wide definition of unfair practices, thus essentially
limiting any host State general good claim.
To date, 2 9 the Unfair Commercial Practices Proposal has
reached the stage at which the Council has issued a common
position with a view to the adoption of the proposal as a directive. 23" The Council has accepted the concept of full harmonization that the Commission originally set out but has weakened
the proposal in several ways. Among other things, and most importantly for the purposes of this Article, the Council position
states Member States, "[i]n relation to 'financial services' . . .
may impose requirements which are more restrictive or prescriptive than this Directive in the field which it approximates. '"231
The position also allows the Member States to establish more
restrictive requirements for transactions involving "immovable
property. ' 23 2 Next, the Council position eliminates the concept
of home State control and mutual recognition that was contained in the Commission proposal.2 33 Finally, the Member
States will have up to eight years after the entry into force of the
directive in which they "shall be able to apply national provisions
within the field approximated by this Directive which are more
restrictive or prescriptive than this Directive and which imple23 4
ment directives containing minimum harmonization clauses.
A second report on the Consumer Credit Proposalby the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market was issued on
229. December 31, 2004.
230. Common Position adopted by the Council with a view to the adoption of a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-toconsumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive
84/450/EEC, directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No. /2004 of the European Parliament
and of the Council, Institutional File: 2003/0134 (COD), CONSOM 63, MI 215,
CODEC 929 (November 15, 2004) [hereinafter the Common Position].
231. Id. art. 3.9.
232. Id.
233. CompareUnfair Commercial Practices Proposal, supra note 186, Recital 9, with
Common Position, supra note 230, Recital 9.
234. Common Position, supra note 230, art. 3.5.
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April 2, 2004.235 As a result the Commission issued an Amended
proposal for a directive on October 28, 2004.236 The Committee
report and the amended proposal contain sharply different positions. Altogether, the Committee Proposal contained at237least
Of
152 amendments of the original Consumer Credit Proposal
those, the Commission accepted "as such" forty-five Committee
amendments. It rejected forty-four amendments and accepted
the remainder of the Com"in part or subject to2 reformulation"
38
mittee amendments.
The Committee report and the amended proposal agree on
several changes to the original Consumer Credit Proposal.
Among others, they agree to changes in which:
1. Credit intermediaries will no longer be covered by the
Directive. 2 3 Acting as a credit intermediary "means offering or presenting credit agreements, undertaking
other preparatory work for such agreements, or concluding credit agreements. "240
2. No central data base will be created.2 4 '
3. The use of a "total lending rate" will be deleted; the 2 use
"42
of a calculated annual percentage rate will continue.
4. Creditors will not 24be3 required to give consumers advice
concerning loans.
5. Registration of persons offering credit will not be required.2 44
6. The Directive will not245apply to
a. Pawn businesses.
b. Credit agreements "granted outside the sphere of
235. Second Report on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on the harmonisation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the
Member States concerning credit for consumers, Final A5-0224/2004, RR/
531630EN.docs, PE 338.483 (April 2, 2004) [hereinafter Second Report].
236. Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the harmonisation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of
the Member States concerning credit for consumers repealing Directive 87/102/EC
and modifying Directive 93/13/EC, COM (2004) 747 final (Oct. 28, 2004) [hereinafter
Amended Proposal].
237. See Second Report, supra note 235, at 74.
238. See Amended Proposal, supra note 236, at 3.
239. See Second Report, supra note 235, amend. 29.
240. Id. amend. 37.
241. See id. amends. 68-71.
242. Id. amend. 16.
243. See id. amends. 15 & 65.
244. See id. amend. 29.
245. See id. amend. 55.
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activity (private

credit agreements) ....246
Loans involving amounts up to C1,000.00 and above
C50,000.00.247

Prepayment rights by the consumer have been weakened.2 4 8
249
Door-to-door sales will be permitted.

The Committee report and the Commission disagree concerning the following matters:
1.

The Commission maintains its position that the Directive
should incorporate the strategy of "total harmonisation"
and the "imperative nature of the Directive. 25 0 In contrast, the Committee report adds provisions that clearly
state that the Member States may adopt "more far-reaching provisions for the best possible consumer protection
in accordance with Treaty obligations." 251 The Committee endorses the idea of "targeted harmonisation to allow
the Member States sufficient scope to assure all consumers in the Community of optimum protection of their interests and an equivalent level of protection" with "full
harmonisation" in some areas "to ensure comparability
between credit offers .... 252
2. The Committee
report exempts credit unions from the
253
Directive.
3. The Committee report exempts all credit agreements
concerning or secured by real estate.25 4
4, The Committee report exempts all surety agreements
255
from the Directive.
5. The parties differ on the method of calculation of the
annual percentage rate with one of the major differences
being that the Committee Report would not include costs
voluntarily entered into by the customer or which can be
obtained from another source. 2 56 As such, insurance pre246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. amend. 56.
See id. amend. 58.
See id. amend. 96.
See id. amends. 12 & 64.
See Amended Proposal, supra note 236, at 3.
Second Report, supra note 235, amend. 140.
Id. amend. 6.
See id. amend. 4.
See id. amend. 49.
See id. amend. 47.
See id. amend. 91.
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miums would often not be included in the calculation.
The changes in the Unfair Commercial Practices Proposalwill
effectively open the door to permitting Member States to create
more restrictive provisions in banking that favor consumers in
fields covered by the directive in the name of the general
good.2 5 7 It remains to be seen whether the limitations proposed
by the Committee Report in regard to the Consumer Credit Proposal, and opposed by the Commission, will be adopted. If the
Commission strategy of "total harmonisation and imperative nature '258 does prevail, it still remains to be seen whether, in the
field of credit arrangements, the proposed directive will foreclose any additional action by the Member States or the Court of
Justice in the area of banking that would have the effect of limiting freedom of movement of services or freedom of establishment of businesses from other Member States. One can argue it
will not.
First, the "general good" exception is a very complicated
rule to apply. Even a sophisticated judge might misinterpret it
and, as a result, permit the application of a Member State law
that limits one of the Freedoms. At least one author has asserted
that this has nearly already happened. Michel Tison in his article, Unraveling the General Good Exception,25 accuses the Court in
the Amby case 2 1 of "on the one hand acknowledging that the
French law was contrary to the single passport provided in the
Second Banking Directive, which is based on 'sufficient' harmonization of prudential standards, and on the other hand proceeding to the 'general good' test notwithstanding the existence
of harmonization." 26 1 In that case the Court does speak in terms
of the French law violating both the Treaty provisions concerning the free movement of services and, at the same time, violat257. In a press release, dated February 24, 2005, the European Commissioner for
Health and Consumer Protection announced that Parliament voted to approve the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. The Council has yet to endorse the directive. Reference IP/05/213 [February 24, 2005], available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=ip/05/213&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui
Language=EN.
258. Consumer Credit Proposal, supra note 185, art. 30.
259. Tison, supra note 67, at 338.
260. Criminal Proceedings Against Andre Ambry, Case C-410/96, [1998] E.C.R. I7875.
261. Tison, supra note 67, at 338.
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ing the Second Banking Directive,2 6 2 but the Court may simply

be stating that the law is violating the directive and, if that law
does not apply, it violates the Treaty. The language of the opinion is not clear.
A court could also very narrowly construe the field that a
particular directive covers.2 63 In the Reisburo Broede case2 64 the

Court ruled that a German law could require a debt-collection
agency acting in Germany to use an attorney to represent it,
even though the law of France (the state of establishment of the
agency) did not require such representation. The Court based
its opinion primarily on the "general good" exception applied to
the principle of freedom of services, with the general good being
the protection of creditors or the sound administration of justice. 26 The Court stated as part of its reasoning in the case
"that, in the absence of specific Community rules in the matter, each
Member State is free to regulate the exercise of the legal profession in its territory." 6 6 Thus, the Court at some point may rule

that this type of language gives it the prerogative to apply the
"general good" exception in fields in which the Council has legislated, but in which the Council has not passed a specific rule
concerning the issue before the Court.
A possible example of this type of reasoning by the Court is
the Caixa-Bank case. 26 7 In that case the Court held that the Sec-

ond Banking Directive did not "refer to restrictions on the establishment of companies which, like Caixa-Bank, make use of freedom of establishment in a Member State as subsidiaries of credit
institutions established in other Member States."2 68

It then went

on to apply the factors concerning the "general good" excep262. Ambry, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7875,
25 & 39.
263. See Commission v. Germany, Case 205/84, [1986] E.C.R. 3755, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 69. In Germany, the Court ruled that even though supervisory standards were
harmonized in the First Non-Life Insurance Directive, several supervisory issues were
not covered. See id., [1986] E.C.R. 3755,
34-40, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69. Thus, there
was still room for the Member State to regulate foreign insurers in the interest of the
general good. See id., [1986] E.C.R. 3755, 1 41, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69; see also Tison,
supra note 67, at 337.
264. Case C-3/95, [1996] E.C.R. 1-6511. See Kemikalieninspektionen v. Toolex Alpha, Case C-473/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-5681.
265. See id. $ 36.
266. Id. [ 37 (citing Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Klopp, Case C-107/83,
[1984] E.C.R. 2971) (emphasis added).
267. See Caixa-Bank, Case C-442/2, [2004] E.C.R..
268. Id. 7.
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tion. Such reasoning gives one pause. One could argue that,
among others, Article 18.2 of the Second Banking Directive
(now codified as part of Article 19 of Directive 2000/12/EC)
goes straight to the heart of the issue of restrictions on the establishment of subsidiary banks from other Member States. It states
in part that the:
Member States shall also provide that the activities listed in
Annex I may be carried on within their territories, in accordance with Articles 20(1) to (6), 21(1) and (2), and 22, either
by the establishment of a branch or by way of the provision of
services, by any financial institution from another Member
State, whether a subsidiary of a credit institution or the
jointly-owned subsidiary of two or more credit institutions
269

Keeping in mind the above, one might predict areas where
the "general good" exception may still be used by the Court. For
example, Article 3 of the Consumer Credit Proposal exempts the
application of the proposed directive to agreements that are
granted at annual percentage rates lower than those prevailing
on the market or are not offered to the public generally. 27 0 A
Member State might issue rules that it feels protect borrowers
that fit within these exceptions and use the "general good" exception to defend an attack on the rule. The total impact of
restrictions on such loans could have a significant impact on outof-State lenders.
The Commission foresaw the possibility of such narrow construction in its 2001 Green Paper on European Union Consumer
Protection when discussing the different possible methods of
structuring a directive on commercial practices. It stated that a
framework directive based on the more restrictive concept of
misleading and deceptive practices:
would not cover the full range of matters covered by a comprehensive duty to trade fairly (e.g., the use of selling techniques based on undue influence). Accordingly, divergent
national approaches on matters falling outside the scope of
the duty could continue to develop and further specific regu269. Second Banking Directive, supra note 75,
19.
270. See Consumer Credit Proposal, supra note 185, art. 3(2) (d) (ii)-(iii). The Second Report would amend this exception to apply only to loans from employers to employees. See Second Report, supra note 235, amend. 56.
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lations at EU level would probably be needed.2 71

CONCLUSION
The history of the development of the "general good" exception and directives legislating consumer protection in the
banking area indicates that consumer policy has had a major impact on the development of regulations on banking. Consumer
policy has been used as both a restrictive tool on the development of the internal market for banking and an implementing
tool. The Court ofJustice has used consumer protection to limit
the application of freedom of services and freedom of establishment through the exception. Arguably, the exception is not as
robust as it once was, but it still has the potential for use by the
Court to support Member State restrictions in the name of the
general good. The Commission and Council have used consumer protection to try to strengthen the internal market by legislating consumer directives that affect the banking industry.
The Commission has now proposed very broad Community legislation concerning consumer protection. If passed, the proposals will create large areas of harmonization in the banking field.
However, we cannot be sure that we have heard the last of the
"general good" exception in the banking area. It is a complex
concept and could be used by a Court intent on approving Member State restrictions that might not otherwise pass muster in
light of the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement of services or the freedom of establishment. In conclusion, we can
look forward to further interaction between the Court in its application of the "general good" exception and the Commission's
efforts to bring about the internal market.

271. Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection, COM (2001) 531
final, 4.2.

